How China is using new small aid strategy to increase influence in Pacific

New Delhi, Oct 11 (IANS): While China may not be the largest provider of development finance to the Pacific island nations, it has positioned itself as the region’s integral development partner, which has helped it to increase its influence in the region.
Although between 2008 and 2024, Australia accounted for 38 per cent of total development finance to Pacific island countries, China’s diplomatic, economic, and security presence has expanded considerably. The significance of this development lies less in the volume of Chinese assistance than in the sectors and institutions through which Beijing has established itself, according to a report in PML Daily.
Among Australians surveyed, 39 per cent identified China as the country with the greatest influence in the Pacific, compared with 33 per cent for Australia. This reversed the previous year’s result, when Australia led China by 39 to 34 per cent.
China’s economic engagement with the Pacific has undergone a significant change. Its early expansion was associated with large infrastructure projects financed through Chinese policy-bank loans. This model generated considerable attention, particularly in Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea.
However, Chinese lending has declined substantially from its 2010s peak. Beijing has increasingly shifted towards smaller grants and more frequent projects. China’s aid spending remains below its earlier peak, while its grant commitments have become a more prominent component of its engagement.
Large infrastructure projects provide visibility but are expensive, slow to implement and potentially politically contentious because of debt obligations. Smaller grants can instead be distributed among schools, hospitals, government agencies and local communities, producing a larger number of recurring interactions between Chinese representatives and Pacific institutions.
The most significant development, however, has been the expansion of Chinese engagement into domestic security institutions. The 2022 China-Solomon Islands security agreement attracted considerable attention because of concerns about a possible Chinese military presence.
The diplomatic dimension is particularly evident in the Pacific’s relationship with Taiwan. Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, while Nauru followed in 2024. These decisions reduced Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the Pacific and expanded the number of governments formally committed to Beijing’s “one-China” principle.
Australia’s development contribution alone is more than four times China’s share of Pacific development finance over the past 15 years. The challenge is consequently not primarily one of resources. It is one of converting resources into sustained institutional and political relationships.
Development assistance should place greater emphasis on speed, accessibility and smaller projects. China’s shift towards frequent, smaller grants demonstrates the political utility of engagement that reaches local institutions rather than remaining concentrated in major national projects, the report added.
–IANS
